{
  "id": "webhook_handler",
  "label": "Webhook Handler Canonical",
  "phase": "phase-09",
  "category": "operational_flows",
  "status": "ACTIVE_DH_MIRROR",
  "purpose": "Govern inbound external events before they become internal work.",
  "function": "Validate source, signature, payload, idempotency, permission and routing for webhook-triggered actions.",
  "technology_requirements": [
    {
      "technology": "Webhook Intake Handler",
      "required_for": "Govern inbound external events before they become internal work.",
      "required_by_phase": "phase-09",
      "required_by_category": "webhook_handler",
      "required_by_buckets": [
        "Prerequisites",
        "Installation",
        "Configuration",
        "Validation",
        "Observable Evidence",
        "Failure Modes & Recovery",
        "Completion & Promotion"
      ],
      "expected_version": "MISSING until Webhook Intake Handler is implemented and validated in the future Execution & Monitoring Panel",
      "validation_command": "MISSING until webhook_handler can prove scope, evidence, execution state and promotion decision",
      "evidence_path": "/home/yeff/public_html/devon/canon/execution/state/dh_sources/webhook_handler.json",
      "status_source": "Documentation Hub + future Execution & Monitoring Panel",
      "blocking_if_missing": true,
      "failure_impact": "Inbound events are executable pressure from outside the system. A webhook without signature proof, idempotency and route control can rerun work, forge intent or mutate state remotely. This category turns external triggers into accountable events instead of blind interrupts."
    }
  ],
  "depends_on": [
    "api_connector_registry",
    "integration_gateway",
    "execution_ledger"
  ],
  "used_by": [
    "job_queue_task_runner",
    "operator_panel",
    "observability_audit"
  ],
  "overview": {
    "summary": "Webhook Handler Canonical owns the inbound event boundary of DEVON-DEV. It treats every external trigger as suspicious until source identity, payload shape and replay safety are proven.",
    "function": "FUNCTION: Validate signature, source connector, event type, payload schema, idempotency key, allowed route, permission and dispatch target before a webhook becomes a task or state change.",
    "system_position": "API Connector Registry identifies the event owner. Integration Gateway routes the event. Job Queue / Task Runner handles asynchronous dispatch. Execution Ledger records the event-to-action chain so external triggers cannot disappear into runtime.",
    "failure_impact": "Inbound events are executable pressure from outside the system. A webhook without signature proof, idempotency and route control can rerun work, forge intent or mutate state remotely. This category turns external triggers into accountable events instead of blind interrupts."
  },
  "failure_impact": "Inbound events are executable pressure from outside the system. A webhook without signature proof, idempotency and route control can rerun work, forge intent or mutate state remotely. This category turns external triggers into accountable events instead of blind interrupts."
}